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Walking on Thin Ice: The Perception of Tortious Liability 
Rules and the Effect on Altruistic Behaviour 
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1. Introduction 
 
A desirable characteristic in any society is the willingness of individuals to help each other out 
from time to time. The majority of us would hope that in times of peril or distress, our fellow 
citizens would be inclined to offer their assistance. Equally, where the situation does not require 
intervention to help out in the face of imminent danger, there remains a significant societal 
benefit to be gained from those who voluntarily take it upon themselves to do something to 
help their fellow neighbour, or who endeavour to undertake a task with the desire of assisting 
members of the public in a broader context.1 
 In the same way we hear about altruistic acts, we also hear about situations in which 
onlookers have stood by and done nothing.2 If a bystander faced real and apparent danger in 
having to attempt a rescue, then the justification for refraining to act is perhaps more 
convincing than in, say, a situation where assistance could be provided without any real threat 
of harm to the helper. In the latter scenario, then, why might people choose not to act when 
their altruism may confer a benefit to someone else, without any significant burden to 
themselves? One potential reason is that people may be deterred from acting as a result of fear 
of increased exposure to legal liability should they intervene and should something 
subsequently go wrong.3 The sparse evidence that exists seems to suggest that a considerable 
proportion of those who have never volunteered are worried about liability when asked about 
the reasons for not volunteering.4 
                                                 
 Dr Sebastian Peyer, UEA Law School & Centre for Competition Policy; Prof Rob Heywood, UEA Law 
School. The corresponding author can be reached at s.peyer@uea.ac.uk. 
1 The economic value of formal volunteering is estimate to be in the range of £36 to 40 billion. Natalie Low and 
others, ‘Helping Out, A National Survey of Volunteering and Charitable Giving’ (2007) 
http://www.ivr.org.uk/component/ivr/helping-out-a-national-survey-of-volunteering-and-charitable-giving 16. 
2  See, for example, recent news stories: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/19/police-seemed-
hesitant-water-help-river-lea-death-jack-susianta-inquest; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/nov/13/how-do-i-respond-racial-abuse-public-transport-onlookers-silent. 
3 Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, ‘Unshackling Good Neighbours’ (May 2011) Report of the Task Force 
established to consider how to cut red tape for small charities, voluntary organisations and social enterprises 10. 
4 Low and others (n 1) 68. 
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  Concerns that those who rescue, help or volunteer may face liability have prompted 
the government to enact section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 and, more recently, the Social 
Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (SARAH). SARAH’s objective is to allow the 
courts to consider the public benefits when assessing the breach of a duty, especially in the 
context of activities that confer a benefit to society. It supplements and arguably reiterates 
section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006.5 Anecdotal evidence and newspaper reporting may 
reinforce the perception that there is a legal liability issue concerning altruistic acts that, in 
turn, may discourage people to act. Occasionally, we encounter information that encourages 
people to conduct themselves in the exact opposite way to that which would be beneficial to 
society.6  
 Our first proposition is that the tort of negligence treats volunteers and non-professional 
rescuers leniently and that there is a negligible risk of liability for altruistic acts.7 Secondly, we 
suggest that certain misperceptions about the risk of liability may deter potential volunteers 
from acting in the public interest. We argue that section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 and 
SARAH are legislative attempts to provide an increased measure of protection for volunteers 
by ensuring that the threshold for legal culpability remains high. Thus, while there is a risk of 
liability, it will only be imposed in exceptional circumstances. If the aims of these legislative 
provisions are conveyed effectively beyond a mere legal audience, it may allow would-be 
volunteers to recognise that the chances of a successful court case being brought against them 
are remote. This may go some way towards redressing any overestimation that citizens may 
have about the chances of becoming the subject of a law suit, which, in turn, may lead to a 
greater inclination among members of society to act altruistically.8 
 We structure our paper as follows: in the first section, we define what we mean by 
altruistic acts in order to locate the main focus of our research. We highlight some of the 
problems that arise in a legal sense when someone with no duty to act does in fact decide to do 
so.9 In the next section, the analysis proceeds to converge on the theoretical legal difficulties 
                                                 
5 Most commentators criticise section 1 and SARAH for being unnecessary and void of any purpose. For an 
assessment and overview of these legislative changes see Neil Partington, ‘Beyond the ‘Tomlinson Trap’: 
Analysing the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006’ [2016] 37 Liverpool Law Review 33; 
Rachael Mulheron, ‘Legislating Dangerously: Bad Samaritans, Good Society, and the Heroism Act 2015’ (2017) 
80 The Modern Law Review 88. See also The Scout Association v Barnes [2010] EWCA Civ 1476. 
6 For an example where rescuers aborted a rescue mission, see Julian Fulbrook, ‘Rescuers and the Concept of a 
"Negligent Rescue"’ (2013) Journal of Person Injury Law 81, 94. 
7 We do not look into the liability for intentional wrongdoing. 
8 The perception of liability is an empirical problem and we plan to conduct future research. 
9 Gerwyn L H Griffiths, ‘The Standard of Care Expected of a First-Aid Volunteer’ (1990) 53 The Modern Law 
Review 255; Fulbrook (n 6). 
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associated with altruistic behaviour. Here we investigate the concept of duty of care and the 
question of breach. Following our legal analysis, we progress to explore the behavioural 
aspects of law, examining some of the known biases that may contribute towards certain 
perceptions of the law and how it operates. We then provide an overview of some of the factors 
that may cause reluctance among certain members of society to provide help when it would 
easily be within their gift to do so. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Setting the Scene 
 
From the outset, it is prudent to define what we mean by altruistic acts and which activities we 
are going to exclude from our subsequent analysis. The National Survey of Volunteering and 
Charitable Giving defines volunteering as "[a]ny activity which involves spending time, 
unpaid, doing something which aims to benefit someone (individuals or groups) other than or 
in addition to close relatives, or to benefit the environment."10 Batson and Shaw suggest the 
following: "Altruism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's 
welfare."11 Thus, giving unpaid time to do something that ultimately increases the welfare of 
others (or attempts to increase the welfare of others) is our working definition of altruism. 
When we use the term volunteer or rescuer in this article, we refer to a person acting 
altruistically as we have outlined in this section. 
 Most acts of altruism are simple and are undertaken in the course of everyday life. Acts 
performed by ordinary citizens such as helping a visually impaired person to cross a busy road, 
offering to assist an elderly person in unloading her shopping bags, or clearing snow from 
footpaths. It is important to remember that not every act of altruism need involve a rescue, nor 
will every act necessarily engage a professional person whose training and skills could be 
usefully deployed in an emergency situation. The vast majority of help is offered by individuals 
who have no particular skill or training. The focus of our investigation is on voluntary acts of 
assistance or help, in whatever form they may take, provided by non-professional members of 
the public. Thus, we would include within this definition situations in which a passer-by assists 
a fellow citizen in the form of helping him to move or transport an item of property. Moreover, 
                                                 
10  Low and others (n 1) 10. See also Compact, ‘Volunteering, Compact Code of Good Practice’ (2005) 
www.compactvoice.org.uk/sites/default/files/volunteering.pdf 4. 
11 C. D Batson and Laura L Shaw, ‘Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives’ (1991) 2 
Psychological Inquiry 107, 108. 
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within the ambit of our definition, we would also include more general voluntary acts aimed at 
benefiting not just one individual, but members of the public at large. One illustration could 
perhaps be clearing snow from the pavement or voluntarily spreading grit on the roads in icy 
conditions. The potentially far-reaching nature of these examples naturally indicates that our 
analysis is not limited solely to the rescue-type scenario, although, of course, this type of 
example could fall within the reach of our definition should it involve an ordinary citizen 
attempting to rescue another person who was in imminent danger. On this point, there is another 
side to consider, which focuses on the potential harm that a rescuer could suffer. In this 
situation, the legal debate centres on the extent to which the rescuer should be able to recover 
damages from a defendant who creates a dangerous situation.12 While we feel it is important 
to at least acknowledge this flip side of the coin, our analysis is only concerned with the 
potential liability of rescuers. 
 Falling outside the boundaries of our definition would be acts of assistance provided by 
professionals, such as those undertaken by the fire, ambulance, police and coastguard services. 
We also exclude from our analysis voluntary acts of altruism performed by off-duty doctors, 
and General Practitioners outside their patient catchment areas.13 Whilst we acknowledge that 
any assistance provided by doctors and General Practitioners acting outside the sphere of their 
direct professional obligations maybe viewed as voluntary and altruistic behaviour, we would 
argue that they have professional skills and competencies which place them in a different 
position to those who do not possess such attributes. There are a number of reasons for 
narrowing our research to non-professional actors. The broad principles of negligence apply to 
both amateurs and professionals. However, the legal difference lies in the standard of care that 
is expected should a professional choose to act.14 McNair J explained that "[t]he test [for 
professionals] is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that 
special skill" rather than the man on the Clapham Omnibus.15 In addition to the higher standard 
of care for professional rescuers, many professional rescuers act in the course of their 
employment. In Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council it was suggested that the 
rescuer who receives a salary or some kind of compensation for the services provided is not 
                                                 
12 See Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912; Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 
966.  
13 See Kevin Williams, ‘Doctors as Good Samaritans, Some Empirical Evidence Concerning Emergency Medical 
Treatment in Britain’ (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 258. 
14 Bolam v Friern Management Hospital Committee [1957] 2 All ER. 
15 ibid. 
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normally regarded as a volunteer.16 Thus a person acting in such a capacity would not fall under 
our definition of an altruistic actor. As we have outlined above, altruistic acts are provided 
without payment or compensation. Another complication arises from the fact that the 
government frequently funds rescuers such as the emergency services or the police. 
Accordingly, it would be rather difficult to separate the issue of public authority liability from 
the problem of liability for altruistic misfeasance. 
 The separation between professionals and amateurs is relatively straightforward, yet 
there is a potential grey area surrounding volunteers who may have some training and 
qualifications, but who are not technically classed as professionals.  Irrespective of any training 
and qualifications that an individual may have, judges in England tend to accept that volunteers 
are not judged according to a professional standard.17  Thus, our interest focuses on whether or 
not the apparent judicial sympathy towards volunteers is recognised in a way that could 
usefully encourage acts of altruism. 
 There is also a question about the effect that media reporting has on the mind-set of 
would-be helpers. As we will show below, news reports of accidents and potential liability in 
the context of volunteering may feed the perception that helping others may be costly. It may 
cause members of society to feel wary about performing certain helpful activities for fear of 
any legal consequences that may ensue should something untoward happen as a result of their 
efforts. Citizens’ overestimation of the potential imposition of liability for altruistic acts could 
be contributing to a culture of passive inaction within society.  
 
3. Altruistic Behaviour: The Legal Position in England 
 
The examples we have outlined above offer different challenges for the tort of negligence. In 
some instances, the question is whether a duty of care exists. In most cases, however, 
commentators focus on the aspect of breach of duty and the potential deterrent effect of liability 
on socially desirable activity. In the first part of our analysis, we consider whether the helper 
owes a duty of care to an injured party. We will then review the breach of duty problems. 
 
                                                 
16 Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] EWCA Civ 3091; Kent v Griffiths [2000] 
EWCA Civ 3017 at [19]. 
17 See Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318. 
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3.1 Duty of care 
 
In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the law does not recognise a duty to act. Thus, a 
non-helper does not normally owe a duty of care in instances where he fails to intervene. This 
legal position is based largely on a range of policy considerations, illuminated neatly by Lord 
Hoffmann in Stovin v Wise.18 He identified political, moral and economic arguments in support 
of the law’s position. In political terms it is less of an invasion of an individual's freedom for 
the law to require him to consider the safety of others in his actions than to impose upon him a 
duty to rescue or protect. In a moral sense, it would be difficult to ascertain who, in fact, should 
be liable, for a duty to prevent harm to others or to render assistance to a person in danger may 
apply to a large and indeterminate class of people who happen to be able to do something. 
From an economic perspective, whereas having to pay compensation for loss caused by 
negligent conduct acts as a deterrent against increasing the cost of the activity to the community 
and reduces externalities, no similar justification exists for requiring a person who is not doing 
anything to spend money on behalf of someone else.19 Nevertheless, what if a person decides 
to come to the rescue of another without being obliged to do so or, more generally, voluntarily 
helps her neighbour? If that person voluntarily decides to act and causes harm to the claimant 
or the claimant’s property, the question arises whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty 
of care. 
The courts prefer to use existing categories to incrementally develop the duty of care 
and it is useful to consider the principles articulated in Caparo v Dickmann. The claimant must 
show that there was proximity between the claimant and the defendant; that damage to the 
claimant was foreseeable; and that it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the 
defendant.20 The foreseeability element is unlikely to be problematic; careless conduct, even 
with the best of intentions, creates a risk of harm. Provided it is reasonably foreseeable that 
some physical injury or damage to property could have occurred from the defendant’s careless 
conduct, then the foreseeability element to the duty will be satisfied. Indeed, in Mitchell v 
Glasgow CC it was stated that ‘the concept of reasonable foreseeability embraced a wide range 
of degrees of possibility, from the highly probable to the possible but highly improbable’21, 
                                                 
18 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923. 
19 ibid at 943-944. 
20 Caparo v Dickmann [1990] 2 A.C. 
21 [2009] UKHL 11 at [18], per Lord Hope. See also Lord Nicholls in A-G (British Virgin Islands) v Hartwell 
[2004] UKPC 12. 
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prompting Rachael Mulheron to conclude that ‘this sets a very undemanding test’.22 Hence, 
foreseeability alone does not create a duty of care.23 
With the above in mind, we now focus on the proximity between claimant and 
defendant and the categories of duty of care that have been created for Good Samaritans and 
volunteers. Since no duty of care is owed to the public at large, the element of proximity 
identifies the individual “[…] who is so closely and directly affected by your act that you ought 
reasonably to have him in contemplation as being so affected when you are directing your mind 
to the acts or omissions which are called in question."24 
In Capital & Counties the Court of Appeal discussed two possible approaches to deal 
with proximity in rescue scenarios.25 Proximity can be established where the defendant had 
control over the danger or created the risk that ultimately materialised. Alternatively, “[…] 
proximity will arise […] where someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite 
irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon 
such skill, and there is direct and substantial reliance by the plaintiffs on the defendant's skill.”26 
In Capital & Counties the Court of Appeal recognised that rescuers normally become active 
when there is already a danger or risk that was created by the claimant, third parties or act of 
God. As long as the existing risk materialises no duty of care is owed. As for a new risk created 
by the rescuer himself, the courts have held that the defendant may owe a duty of care to the 
claimant: “…where the rescue/protective service itself by negligence creates the danger which 
caused the plaintiff's injury there is no doubt in our judgment the plaintiff can recover.”27 It is 
crucial therefore to distinguish between the failure to provide an adequate service – for which 
a duty of care may not be owed28 – and the creation of a new risk or source of harm through 
unskilful intervention – which can create liability. In Kent v Griffiths Lord Woolf MR identified 
two potential types of case in which a volunteer may owe a duty of care:29 the ‘adding damage 
scenario’, relying on East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent,30 and a scenario in which 
the helper causes damage beyond that harm the claimant would have suffered anyway, 
                                                 
22 Rachael Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (CUP 2016) 53. 
23 McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, 420, per Lord Wilberforce. 
24 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 per Lord Atkin. 
25 Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire County Council (n 16). 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 Ambulance services may owe a duty of care for failure to provide an adequate service, see Kent v Griffiths (n 
16). 
29 Kent v Griffiths (n 16) at [15]. 
30 East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1940] A.C. 74, 102. 
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supported by the ruling in Horsley v MacLaren (The Ogopogo).31 Thus, if a rescuer attempts 
to help a victim, he owes a duty not to create an additional risk or harm greater than the victim 
would have suffered anyway.32 
Alternatively, the claimant may assert that she relied on the defendant’s skill in 
performing the rescue.33 In Capital & Counties it was argued that the rescuer assumes a duty 
to be careful when attempting the rescue, based on the assumption of responsibility principle 
developed in Hedley Byrne & Co. v Heller & Partners.34 The relationship can be based on an 
undertaking and the victim’s reliance on it, or the rescuer’s assumed control of the danger.35 
The Court of Appeal rejected this approach with regard to fire services, arguing that, even in a 
failed rescue attempt, the victim would not have been in a worse situation: “It is not clear why 
a rescuer who is not under an obligation to attempt a rescue should assume a duty to be careful 
in effecting the rescue merely by undertaking the attempt.”36 
So far, we have discussed the legal framework that specifically applies to rescuers but, 
as we have pointed out above, this article principally seeks to assess the liability of non-
professional volunteers, whose actions may not fit within a ‘rescue’ type scenario. What is the 
situation then in regard to more routine acts of altruism, such as, say, clearing snow? Applied 
to acts of altruism, the ‘creating a new or additional harm’ and ‘assumption of responsibility’ 
tests are rather broad and could include most if not all types of volunteering and helping. The 
‘creating a new or additional harm’ test would especially apply to many instances in which the 
volunteer’s activity has increased the risk of injury. There are a range of different examples of 
altruistic activities that could be used to illustrate some of the conceptual difficulties in the 
application of the law in general, and in particular the conceptual difficulties surrounding the 
‘new risk test’. These could include, amongst others, cleaning leaves from footpaths in the 
autumn, cutting overgrown hedges that have infringed on public footpaths, cleaning a local 
                                                 
31 Horsley v MacLaren (The Ogopogo) [1971] R.C.S. 441.  
32 East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent (n 30) 102. 
33 The assumption of responsibility test was successfully applied in Watson v British Boxing Board of Control 
Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 2116. The Court of Appeal held that a boxing association assumes responsibility for the 
well-being of a boxer. Rescuers who worsen the situation of the victims have also been discussed with regard to 
the concept of detrimental reliance – circumstances in which the claimant changes his behaviour for the worse, 
trusting the rescuer’s intervention, Jeroen Kortmann, Altruism in Private Law - Liability for Nonfeasance and 
Negotiorum Gestio (OUP 2005) 62. 
34 Hedley Byrne & Co. v Heller & Partners [1964] AC 465; see also Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] 
UKHL 5. With criticism: Kit Barker, ‘Unreliable Assumptions in the Modern Law of Negligence’ (1993) 109 
Law Quarterly Review 461. The courts apply Hedley Byrne to a wider range of scenarios than just negligent 
misstatements as in the original case. The Supreme Court reiterated the wider application in Michael v Chief 
Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2 para 67. 
35 Kortmann (n 3339) 44ff. 
36 Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire County Council (n 16) at [58]. 
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park or maintaining community green spaces.  For the purposes of consistency, our analysis 
focuses on the key example of snow clearing, although the legal and interpretational problems 
we expose throughout could equally apply to any of the above examples, and indeed more.   
 In the snow clearing scenario, then, we first need to distinguish between scenarios 
where a volunteer has actually made the situation worse by, for example, adopting a careless 
technique to remove snow, and those instances where the snow was cleared in accordance with 
government guidelines and the exercise of reasonable care.37 In the former case, we will 
experience few problems establishing proximity and, thus, a duty of care applying Capital & 
Counties as the volunteer has created a new sources of harm. The latter case is more difficult 
to assess. The individual who clears the pavement from snow actually reduces the risk of injury 
because it is safer to walk on a cleared footpath rather than on ice and snow. If we applied the 
test outlined in Capital & Counties, the helper does not owe a duty of care to the unlucky victim 
who injures himself slipping on the cleared path unless the risk of slipping after clearing the 
path is defined as a new risk, compared to the original risk of merely slipping on undisturbed 
snow.38 This interpretation of the 'new risk' test ignores the fact that any snow-clearing actually 
reduced the overall risk of injury, and instead focuses on the new risk of harm created by the 
intervention. This seems to disadvantage non-professional, non-rescuer volunteers in the 
context of duty of care. Unlike professional or trained rescuers, volunteers are more likely to 
create or contribute to the risk that crystallises because trained rescuers normally “[…] act in 
the context of a danger already created and damage already caused […]”39. Thus, if the risk 
criterion is used to establish proximity, there is a strong case for imposing a duty of care on the 
volunteer or helper when she causes injury, for it is normally her who is actually responsible 
for creating that new or additional risk of harm.40  
The ‘assumption of responsibility’ approach is equally likely to lead to an arbitrary 
distinction between situations in which a duty of care is owed and where one is not. By way of 
illustration, it is doubtful that the volunteer clearing snow purports to have a special skill on 
                                                 
37 See, for example, the guidance available at https://www.gov.uk/clear-snow-road-path-cycleway.  
38 One could argue that the hapless helper created a new risk by clearing the path that is different from the slipping 
risk on snow. 
39 Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire County Council (n 16) at [33]. The quote continues: “[…] whether by the 
forces of nature, or the acts of some third party or even of the plaintiff himself, and whether those acts are criminal, 
negligent or non-culpable.” 
40 The Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper: Civil Liability of Good Samaritans and Volunteers (Dublin 
2007) 89. 
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which the claimant can reasonably rely. Even in circumstances where one could think of special 
skills, it is doubtful that the victim reasonably relied on that expertise.41 
It is unrealistic to expect that the law will respond with a single legal test to the 
multitude of situations in which an altruistic act may go wrong. Despite the more theoretical 
than real risk of liability, from a policy point of view it would be desirable if the law could 
send a strong signal to volunteers that there is little to fear from mishaps that occur in the course 
of volunteering, but neither the ‘new risk’ test nor the ‘assumption of responsibility’ test 
provide that certainty. As relationships can differ from scenario to scenario, the proximity 
criterion fails to provide a conclusive answer as to the duty owed by volunteers to third parties. 
The case law on rescue scenarios favours the risk of injury as an element to establish 
proximity and, thus, a duty of care. By analogy, we argue that the risk of injury test can also 
be utilised for imposing a duty of care in non-rescue, altruistic actions that have led to injury. 
The other question to consider at this point is whether the imposition of a duty should be 
precluded on the grounds of it not being fair, just and reasonable. Public policy considerations 
limit liability in certain areas, such as actions of public authorities,42 pure psychiatric injury43 
and pure economic loss.44 These types of public policy concerns are arguably less relevant in 
the context of liability for altruistic acts, for imposing a duty on a volunteer is unlikely to be 
inconsistent with any wider objective of the law, nor would it unreasonably impinge upon the 
interests of any one party.  However, in Capital & Counties Stuart-Smith LJ suggested that 
“…if […] investigation of the allegedly negligent conduct would itself be undesirable and open 
to abuse by those bearing grudges, the law will not impose a duty.”45 Thus, one element to 
consider in the realms of policy, is the desirability of altruistic activity. A closer look at this 
policy consideration though reveals that it is usually dealt with when assessing the standard of 
care, and so we will discuss the ‘public interest in volunteering’ in that context. At present, we 
would argue that there are no convincing policy reasons to exclude a duty being imposed on 
volunteers in principle and would thus conclude that those who act altruistically but cause harm 
in the process would owe a duty of care to the victim. 
 
                                                 
41 But see Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 WLR 29 where the court dealt with an unpaid adviser as gratuitous 
agent as well as negligent misrepresentation according to Hedley Byrne v Heller (n 34). 
42 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1987] UKHL 12. 
43 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1991] UKHL 5. 
44 Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd. v Martin & Co Ltd. [1972] EWCA Civ 3. 
45 Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire County Council (n 16) at [74]. 
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3.2 Standard of care 
 
We have identified that the imposition of a legal duty may be largely unproblematic where a 
person undertakes to perform a task of his or her own volition, so we now turn our attention to 
the question of breach of duty. Alderson B described negligence as ‘the omission to do 
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate 
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable 
man would not do.’46 With this in mind, two questions are pertinent: what standard of care does 
the law require from a volunteer when he performs an altruistic act? How should the law 
account for the utility of the volunteer’s action? 
In most situations, volunteers will lack the special skills required to help but, at the 
same time, many of these activities can also be provided by professionals. For example, a 
rescuer may have no first-aid experience, or be a retired physician who actually knows how to 
provide medical assistance. Which standard will apply to them: that of an untrained amateur, 
that of a trained first-aider or that of a trained doctor? In Cattley v St John's Ambulance Brigade 
Prosser QC suggested to apply the standard of a first-aider to a trained rescuer: “[…] the true 
test for establishing negligence in a first-aider is whether he has been proved to be guilty of 
such failure as no first-aider of ordinary skill would be guilty of, if acting with ordinary care.”47 
In Prosser’s view the correct standard of care is that of an ordinary person professing to have 
a special skill as per Bolam v Friern Management Hospital.48 In Vowles v Evans Lord Phillips 
referred obiter to the skill level expected from a volunteer, stating that “[…] sometimes in the 
case of amateur sport, the referee fails to turn up, or is injured in the course of the game, and a 
volunteer referee is called for from the spectators. In such circumstances the volunteer cannot 
reasonably be expected to show the skill of one who holds himself out as referee, or perhaps 
even to be fully conversant with the Laws of the Game.”49 Lord Phillips made clear that the 
volunteer’s action should be judged according to a more forgiving standard.  
 A similar line of argument was applied to other rescuers who were not expected to reach 
a professional skill level. In Horsley v MacLaren (The Ogopogo), the Canadian Supreme Court 
was sympathetic to a defendant who attempted to rescue a passenger when the latter fell 
                                                 
46 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks [1856] 156 ER 1047 at 1049. 
47 Cattley v St John's Ambulance Brigade [1988] Lexis Citation 1703, 6–7. 
48 Bolam v Friern Management Hospital Committee (n 14). See also the Bolitho qualification of the Bolam test.  
Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] UKHL 46. 
49 Vowles v Evans [2003] (n 17) 328. The law of negligence does not usually take account of the inexperienced 
actor, Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 (CA); Wilsher v Essex AHA [1987] EB 730 (CA) but does adjust the 
standard of care in accordance with the specialism and skill level of the defendant, Bolam (n 14). 
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overboard from the defendant’s cruiser. A question arose as to whether a textbook procedure 
would have saved the claimant, yet, as it could not be said that the botched rescue attempt had 
demonstrably worsened the claimant’s position, no liability was imposed.  If, however, it could 
be established that a rescue attempt worsened the situation for the rescued, it was suggested 
that this could lead to negligence liability.  It was equally stressed that all circumstances must 
be taken into account and “existing circumstances of emergency” may help to excuse mistakes 
or procedures that were carried in a non-standard manner.50  
The courts have consistently stressed that the individual circumstances must be taken 
into account when determining whether the defendant took reasonable care.51 In Day v High 
Performance Sports Ltd Hunt J held that the circumstances of the rescue must be taken into 
account and a hindsight bias should be avoided.52 He refused to impose liability on a climbing 
centre in which the claimant was injured, arguing that it did not breach its duty towards the 
claimant by attempting an unsuitable rescue procedure. The court's decision was influenced by 
the fact that the claimant's injury would have occurred in any case and a suitable rescue attempt 
would have been too late.  
 In Smoldon v Whitworth it was held that in order to assess the standard of care exercised 
by a rugby referee “[t]he level of care required is that which is appropriate in all the 
circumstances, and the circumstances are of crucial importance.”53 It is particularly interesting 
to note that “[f]ull account must be taken of the factual context in which a referee exercises his 
functions, and he could not be properly held liable for errors of judgment, oversights or lapses 
of which any referee might be guilty in the context of a fast-moving and vigorous contest. The 
threshold of liability is a high one.”54 Lord Phillips MR shared Lord Bingham's assessment in 
another rugby case where the game ended with tragic injury.55 In Vowles v Evans, he held that 
an amateur rugby referee owed a duty of care to the players under his charge and breached that 
duty by failing to implement the rules that were supposed to protect the players from injury. 
The decisions have been criticised as potentially deterring amateurs from taking the whistle 
                                                 
50 Horsley v MacLaren (The Ogopogo) (n 31) 452. 
51 Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 W.L.R. 835. 
52 Day v High Performance Sports Ltd [2003] EWHC 197 (QB). See also Eckersley and others v Binnie and others 
[1988] 18 ConLR 1. The threshold for establishing a breach has been set at a high level between spectators and 
participants in sport events, Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43, Caldwell v Maguire [2001] EWCA Civ 1054. 
53 Smoldon v Whitworth [1996] ELR 249 256. 
54 ibid. See also Caldwell v Maguire Fitzgerald (n 52). 
55 Vowles v Evans (n 17) 326. 
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and refereeing a game for fear of liability.56 Lord Phillips asserted in Vowles v Evans that the 
liability threshold for amateurs stepping in is a high one.57 He addressed the potential deterrent 
effect of the court's decision on volunteers by stressing, obiter, the low probability of severe 
injury and, consequently, the low probability that someone is held liable. Liability in Vowles v 
Evans was established based on the particular facts, i.e. the failure to implement the rules of 
the game. We agree that the injuries in both Smoldon v Whitworth and Vowles v Evans were 
extreme. However, the failure to implement the rules of the games may not be as uncommon 
as their Lordships claim. Overall, the legal nuances of the decisions may be lost on the amateur 
and the message received from those decisions may suggest a propensity for liability. 58 
Smoldon v Withworth and Vowles v Evans can be treated as exceptions to the general rule; 
arguably they do not change the overall picture of lenient legal treatment of volunteers and 
helpers. Nonetheless, whether this message has been accurately conveyed to the public is rather 
doubtful.59 
How can we apply the lessons from rescue situations and amateur sports to volunteers 
and helpers in other areas? It is clear that the individual circumstances determine whether there 
is a breach of duty. Clearing snow from a pavement, for example, may not completely remove 
the risk of slipping, but it does actually make walking safer. Thus, any error on the part of a 
defendant would need to be severe for liability to be imposed. The courts are also obliged to 
take into account the surrounding circumstances, such as the priority that a Council would 
attach to clearing a particular road and any delay that may have occurred. Given the costs 
incurred, some Councils may demonstrate apathy towards dealing with snow and so in many 
cases it may not have been cleared had it not been for the intervention of a defendant. These 
are all considerations which could, potentially, operate in a defendant’s favour.60 
Another aspect of volunteering is the fact that altruistic acts provide benefits for society. 
The question is whether and how these benefits are taken into account when assessing the four 
factors that govern the breach of duty.61 That the value of a particular activity should be part 
                                                 
56  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/rugby-case-changes-rules-of-game-1305736.html (accessed 09 
September 2016). See also David McArdle, ‘The Enduring Legacy of “Reckless Disregard”’ (2005) 34 Common 
Law World Review 316. 
57 See Vowles v Evans (n 17). 
58 Lord Phillips seems to assume that the Court's decision will have no deterrence effect. 
59 This point was made earlier by Rob Heywood and Peter Charlish, ‘Schoolmaster Tackled Hard Over Rugby 
Incident’ (2007) 15 Tort Law Review 162. 
60 David Quarmby, ‘The Resilience of England's Transport Systems in December 2010, an Independent Audit by 
David Quarmby CBE’ (2010) para 3.37. 
61 The courts consider four factors when assessing a breach of duty: the probability of injury, the severity of the 
potential injury, the cost of preventing that injury and the social utility of the activity in question, Bolton v Stone 
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of the breach of duty analysis is not in doubt,62 but how much weight should be given to the 
benefit of an activity is where the contention lies. In Watt v Hertfordshire County Council, 
while on a journey to attend an emergency, a fireman was injured by a heavy jack which had 
been inappropriately secured in the back of a lorry. It was held that the fire authorities were not 
negligent in requiring firemen to take abnormal risks, which they were prepared to take in order 
to save life and limb. Lord Denning reasoned that the existence of an emergency, coupled with 
the need to act urgently in order to save life, justified the risk of transporting the jack in the 
manner that it was in the case.63 Thus, the public utility of the fire service was key factor in 
determining the question of breach. An unavoidable consequence of a fireman’s job is that 
sometimes additional risks will need to be taken in order to save lives and safeguard the public. 
As firemen should expect this, it followed that a degree of leniency should be shown to the fire 
authorities. We might also argue that the same degree of latitude should equally apply to 
altruistic volunteers, because they often act out of a feeling of social responsibility, providing 
a useful service to society, which should accordingly be considered in the assessment of breach. 
From a different perspective, Lord Denning also gave an example of when, after undertaking 
a cost-benefit analysis, the decision in Watt may have gone the other way. He stated: “One 
must balance the risk against the end to be achieved. If this accident had occurred in a 
commercial enterprise without any emergency there could be no doubt that the servant would 
succeed.”64  On the commercial point, we have already noted that volunteers’ actions are 
characterised by giving without being paid or receiving consideration. 65  Thus, the non-
commercial nature of the activity, or, to be more precise, the fact that volunteers give without 
receiving payment in return,66 is a criterion that also ought to weigh heavily in favour of the 
defendant when assessing a breach of duty. 
The importance of weighing the benefits of a particular activity for society was stressed 
by the House of Lords in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council.67. Tomlinson was not a 
rescuer case but it is an important decision as the House of Lords stressed the importance of 
taking into account the social value of an activity when considering a breach of duty, individual 
                                                 
[1951] A.C. 850 and Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] UKHL 47. For an in-depth analysis see, 
for example, Mulheron (n 22) 353ff. 
62 Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd [1946] 2 All ER. 
63 Watt v Hertfordshire County Council (n 51). 
64 Watt v Hertfordshire County Council (n 51) 838. 
65 See section 2. 
66 See our working definition of altruistic actions in section 2. 
67 Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council (n 61). 
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responsibility. Their Lordships also expressed a distaste for defensive measures implemented 
to prevent perceived liability that would deprive society of beneficial activities.68 Although 
Lord Hoffmann held that the defendant owed no duty of care under the Occupiers’ Liability 
Acts 1957 and 1984, he continued his analysis of breach, assuming that such duty existed:69 
“[…] the question of what amounts to "such care as in all the circumstances of the case is 
reasonable" depends upon […] the social value of the activity which gives rise to the risk and 
the cost of preventative measures.” 70  He sought to encourage lawful and socially useful 
activities that could create cost savings.71 There is no doubt that the benefits of such activities 
must be weighed against the risks created and that this is a question of degree and facts.72 The 
social value of an activity will not always trump other factors such as probability of risk and 
severity of harm, but it appears that only instances that resemble gross negligence override the 
social benefits.73 
The House of Lord’s attempt in Tomlinson to reassure volunteers and reduce the 
propensity to engage in defensive practices triggered a debate that ultimately led to the 
enactment of section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006, and the Social Action, Responsibility 
and Heroism Act 2015. Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 reminds a court that setting 
the standard of care  that a reasonable person ought to meet has a knock-on effect on the 
incentives of individuals to undertake ‘desirable activities’,  but it also sought to address a “[…] 
common misperception [of liability] that can lead to a disproportionate fear of litigation and 
consequent risk-averse behaviour”.74 Considering the standard of care in negligence or breach 
of statutory duty, the court may have regard to the potential deterrence effect of finding 
liability. According to Section 1, the court should, when “determining whether the defendant 
should have taken particular steps to meet a standard of care […], have regard to whether a 
requirement to take those steps might 
(a) prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all […], or 
(b) discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable 
activity.” 
                                                 
68 Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council (n 61) at [44]. 
69 ibid at [29]. 
70 ibid at [34].  
71 ibid at [36]. 
72 The Scout Association v Barnes (n 5) 49. 
73 ibid. For other factors see, for example, Bolton v Stone (n 61). Wooldridge v Sumner (n 52) has sometimes been 
interpreted as advocating a ‘reckless disregard’ standard.  
74 Compensation Act 2006 – Explanatory Notes at [7], see also Better Regulation Task Force, ‘Better Routes to 
Redress’ (2004). 
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This can apply to both voluntary actions and altruistic acts, thereby acknowledging that 
these activities are desirable and that volunteers could be deterred if the courts were too quick 
to impose liability. In a number of cases the courts have taken Tomlinson and section 1 into 
account, often observing that section 1 adds nothing to the common law.75 Since the law does 
not suggest immunity for injury caused by a negligent volunteer, the existing weighing test 
continues to determine whether a helper breached a duty of care. 76  Commentators have 
criticised this approach for eroding the reasonable person standard, effectively creating a more 
variable standard.77 
If there was doubt as to the factors that should be taken into account when determining 
the liability of a volunteer, the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (SARAH) 
clarifies that social benefits have to be considered.78 According to section 2, the court must 
scrutinise whether “[…] whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred 
when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members.” Thus, just like the 
Compensation Act 2006, SARAH did not amend the law but rather restated it.79 On the face of 
it, SARAH appears to support our argument that even if a duty of care is owed, the courts 
should not be too quick to hold that there has been a breach of that duty because of the benefits 
that are created by volunteers and good neighbours. However, section 3 requires the defendant 
to “[…] demonstrate […] a predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety 
or other interests of others.” This shifts the balance away from the benefits of the action and 
focuses more on the (avoidable) risks, a problem neatly captured in Scout Association v 
Barnes.80 Here the claimant was injured while playing a game in the dark at a scout meeting. 
It was argued on appeal that the trial judge had given insufficient weight to the social value of 
the activity. The Court of Appeal accepted that scouting activities were valuable to society and 
often contained elements of risk. However, it confirmed the trial judge’s decision that playing 
in the dark significantly increased the risk of injury and that the only justification was the 
                                                 
75 Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 46 (QB) at [19] and [2011] EWCA Civ 66; The Scout 
Association v Barnes (n 5) at [49]; Wilkin-Shaw v Fuller [2012] EWHC 1777 (QB) at [46]; Cornish Glennroy 
Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures Limited [2012] EWHC 2360 QB at [45], [52] and [56]; Humphrey v Aegis 
Defence Services Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 11 at [14]. See also Partington (n 5); Mulheron (n 5). 
76 The Scout Association v Barnes (n 5). 
77 Partington (n 5) 42. 
78  For an insightful commentary, see James Goudkamp, ‘Restating the Common Law? The Social Action, 
Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015’ (2017) Legal Studies (early view). 
79 For marked criticism, see (Lord Pannick) HL Deb 06 January 2015, vol 758, col 262; Jon Robins, ‘A Policy 
Turkey’ (2014) 164 New Law Journal 8; Howard Fidderman, ‘When Will this Madness End’ (2014) Health and 
Safety Bulletin 1; Mulheron (n 5). 
80 The Scout Association v Barnes (n 5). 
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additional excitement. A similar version of the game could have been easily played in the light 
without reducing the educative value.81 One potential problem therefore is that section 3 could 
very well undermine the useful intentions underpinning section 2 because individuals do not 
know ex ante what constitutes a responsible approach. 
SARAH, and to a lesser extent section 1 Compensation Act 2006, have been criticised 
for not changing the law, but for merely aiming to change the perception of liability risks.82  
Even the drafters of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Compensation Act thought that the 
purpose of section 1 Compensation Act 2006 rests primarily in reassuring volunteers and 
improving awareness of this aspect of the law.83 As for the substantive assessment of breach 
of duty, the more recent case law does not show a material impact of section 1 on the 
assessment of breach of duty.84 Judges frequently state that section1 restates the common law 
and usually mention it in passing.85 
In sum, whilst it is clear that the imposition of a duty would be relatively 
straightforward in respect of one who voluntarily undertakes to assist another, in terms of the 
actual assessment of breach, we contend that the courts would be sympathetic to the rescuer. 
Judges have to weigh the various factors that determine a breach of duty, but they also need to 
take into account the potential deterrent effect on desirable activities.86 Thus, we would expect 
a lenient legal treatment of mishaps that occurred in the course of altruistic activities.  
 
4. Perception of liability 
 
So far we have analysed the legal framework that governs liability for altruistic acts. We have 
shown that the threshold for the imposition of liability is high.87 The question is whether this 
message is more widely communicated, and understood, beyond mere legal circles.  It is said 
                                                 
81 The Scout Association v Barnes (n 5). 
82 Mark Lunney, Donal Nolan, Ken Oliphant, Tort Law (6th edn, OUP 2017) 178; see also (n 79). 
83 Compensation Act, Explanatory Note Bill 155- EN, See also Ministry of Justice, ‘Memorandum to the Justice 
Select Committee, Post-Legislative Assessment of the Compensation Act 2006’ (2012). 
84 See case law in footnotes 75 and 85. 
85 See, for example, Hopps v Mott Macdonald Ltd & Anor [2009] EWHC 1881 (QB); Uren v Corporate Leisure 
(n 75); Reynolds v Strutt & Parker LLP [2011] EWHC 2263 (Ch); Sutton v Syston Rugby Football Club Ltd [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1182; Wilkin-Shaw v Fuller (n 75); Cornish Glennroy Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures Ltd (n 75); 
McErlean v St Bride's Primary School [2014] NIQB 1. 
86 The Scout Association v Barnes (n 5) at [49]. See also Horsley v MacLaren (the Ogopogo) (n 31). 
87 Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (n 3) 10: "Lawyers with whom we have discussed this have focused very much on 
this point of myth rather than reality.” 
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that the actions of many are misguided by the fear of liability – one of the elements of the 
ambiguous catchphrase ‘compensation culture’.88 In this section, we will argue that due to 
certain biases, citizens tend to focus on reported cases of liability or incidences of outrageous 
claims (independent of their success) and that these cases have shaped the public perception of 
helpers’ liability. We suggest that an overestimation of the potential to face liability is one  
possible deterrent to voluntary action (there are others such as time constraints). We will first 
explain some of those biases and then provide some evidence in relation to misperception of 
legal rules. In the final section, we argue that the principles articulated in section 1 of the 
Compensation Act 2006, and SARAH, should be communicated more effectively to correct 
any public misconceptions about the risk of incurring civil liability.89  
 
4.1 Insights from the UK 
 
Empirical evidence relating to liability for altruistic acts or the perception thereof is scarce.90 
In the only English study of its kind, physicians in the Sheffield area were surveyed about their 
attitude and experience in regard to Good Samaritan situations. When asked to provide reasons 
for not assisting in a first-aid situation, 44 per cent out of 50 respondents cited the fear of being 
sued as one of the reasons for not assisting.91 While this was not the most important reason for 
doctors not assisting in first-aid situations,92 it shows that a considerable number of individuals 
have considered the liability issue. We have already acknowledged that a low risk of liability 
exists for helpers in general but the liability risk may be higher for professionals such as medics 
in Good Samaritan situations.93 To this end, the doctors in the Sheffield study were perhaps 
justified in feeling reluctant to provide help because they lacked the necessary skills and 
expertise to deal with emergencies; any doctor who does decide to stop and help but who fails 
to display appropriate medical skills when doing so is indeed at risk of being liable.94 However, 
                                                 
88  Goudkamp (n 78) 5. Motivated reasoning may also partially explain the resistance to assist others. The 
unwillingness to help will post hoc be justified by reference to issues such as legal liability, hassle etc., see Ziva 
Kunda, ‘The Case for Motivated Reasoning’ (1990) 108 (3) Psychological Bulletin 480. 
89 More generally, a way of addressing the perception problem is to improve the way in which legal rules are 
communicated. Arguing along similar lines, see Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (n 3) 10. 
90 Luke Bennett and Carolyn Gibbeson, ‘Perceptions of Occupiers' Liability Risk by Estate Managers’ (2010) 2 
International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 76, 77. 
91 Williams (n 13) 268.  
92 The fear of being sued was ranked the 4th most prevalent reason not to act out of eight (including ‘others’). 
93 See section 2. 
94 A common reason identified for not offering assistance was that the participants did not feel they had the 
necessary skills to deal with emergency situations. Williams (n 13) 267. 
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Williams also identified that the participants overestimated their potential exposure to legal 
action.95 Thus, while the risk may be ‘real’ in that there is a certain probability that a volunteer 
may be held liable, the limited evidence available indicates that few rescue/volunteer cases 
make it as far as court and, in those that do, we have seen that judges will adopt a lenient 
approach when it comes to determining the question of breach.96 Thus, the probability of being 
sued may therefore be exaggerated. 
Studies such as Williams’ have a number of limitations and he acknowledged that it 
was beyond the scope of his survey to provide a full picture of participants’ motivation to act 
as Good Samaritans.97 Nonetheless, it seems that the perception of liability is one of the factors 
that is relevant for those who provide aid and it is also a factor that is likely to be given the 
wrong weight due to erroneously estimated probabilities. Williams suggests that the 
understanding of legal rules is random.98 On the basis of William’s study, we would argue that 
this is not just a random guess but a systematic misperception of negligence liability.99 If 
doctors were guessing legal rules randomly, they should have answered correctly in 50 per cent 
of the cases. 100  Since the results from the survey were worse, one could suspect that 
professionals do not only lack knowledge of the negligence rules but may also systematically 
misinterpret the law and, thus, misconceive the risk of negligence liability. 
We were not able to find a study that systematically explores volunteers’ and helpers’ 
perception of liability.101 One of the tentative hypotheses we extract from the Williams’ work 
is that if a systematic misunderstanding of negligence liability for altruistic acts exists among 
medical professionals, it is probably even more widespread among the general public. Medical 
professionals normally receive some basic legal training as part of their schooling, whereas the 
general public do not.102 Thus, it seems more probable that the average individual with less 
knowledge of liability rules will be more likely to over- or underestimate the risk of being liable 
when helping others. This hypothesis needs to be tested, of course, but it receives some support 
                                                 
95 Ibid at 279. 
96 Indeed, Williams himself identifies that the evidence suggests that ‘few (if any) claims are likely to be 
brought’. Ibid at 273.     
97 ibid 265. 
98 ibid 268. 
99 Assuming a sufficiently large sample and that the reported data are reliable. 
100 This is akin to throwing a coin. One may observe a few heads or tails in a row but after a sufficiently large 
number of coin tosses, we should have roughly the same number of tosses that showed either heads or tails. If 
doctors have no knowledge about legal rules and randomly guessed the correct answer to the questions, 50 per 
cent of the answers in the sample should have been correct. 
101 The ‘Helping Out’ survey did not look at this in detail, Low and others (n 1). 
102 Michael Preston-Shoot and Judy McKimm, ‘Prepare for Practice? Law Teaching and Assessment in UK 
Medical Schools’ (2010) 36 Journal of Medical Ethics 694-699. 
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from Lord Hodgson, who was asked to investigate what stops people from giving time to 
charity. Analysing submissions from over 600 individuals and organisations,103 he identified a 
negative mind-set as one of the reasons that lowers the incentives to help. In his view, this 
negative mind-set manifests itself in an overly cautious attitude towards risk and the perception 
that “a lawyer, with a writ at the ready, waits around every corner.”104 He states that “[r]ightly 
or wrongly the fear of becoming involved in litigation is a major preoccupation.”105 We prefer 
the expression of perception of liability to describe situations in which the erroneous fear of 
legal rules impedes acts that would be beneficial to society.  
 
4.2 Insights from behavioural sciences 
 
As we have argued earlier, volunteers perhaps harbour misconceptions about the actual extent 
of their legal exposure. In this section, we further substantiate our hypothesis by looking into 
human biases that shape the perception of risks. While the risk of liability is not quite the same 
as, for example, the risk of becoming the victim of a crime, behavioural sciences offer very 
useful observations with regard to human behaviour that could assist our argument. 106 We 
assert that the perception issue can, to a certain extent, be addressed by signalling, taking into 
account those human weaknesses.107 Consequently, legislative interventions, such as section 
1 of the Compensation Act 2006 and SARAH 2015, could help to reassure lay people, but only 
if their guiding principles are effectively communicated to the public. 
There is a general agreement that humans are not very good at judging risks and, 
consequently, it would seem at assessing the risk of liability.108 Humans generally tend to make 
predictable errors when assessing the probability of accidents or injury.109 The reason is that 
heuristics, the technical term for mental shortcuts or rules of thumb, help most of the decision-
                                                 
103 Lord Hodgson analysis is based on submissions of interested parties but, as far as we can tell, the report did 
not rely on a standard survey or random samples. 
104 Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (n 3) 4. 
105 ibid 10. 
106 For an overview see Vivianne H M Visschers and Ree M Meertens, ‘Associative and Cognitive Processes in 
Risk Perception and Communication’ in Joana G Lavino and Rasmus B Neumann (eds), Psychology of Risk 
Perception (Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, N.Y. 2010). 
107 Paul Slovic, ‘Perception of Risk’ (1987) 236 Science 280. 
108 ibid.  
109  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 
Science 1124. 
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making on a daily basis as they ease the cognitive processes.110 Simple rules of thumb require 
less effort and are on average very useful for ‘survival’ as we derive results relatively quickly. 
However, it has been shown that individuals systematically err with regard to the probability 
that an event occurs and with regard to the impact should such an event occur indeed.111 What 
makes decision-making quick on average does have the disadvantage that it contributes to the 
misperception of risks. 
Heuristics include biases towards events we find easy to recall.112 Humans tend to 
estimate the likelihood of an event, e.g. the risk of being held liable, by the ease with which 
instances or associations can be brought to mind (availability heuristic).113 The availability 
heuristics include, for example, highly publicised causes of death. When asked to judge 
frequencies of death by accidents or homicides, people tend to overestimate the true frequency 
of events, whereas the frequency of under-publicised causes of death like diabetes or asthma is 
underestimated. 114  Thus, in using well-known shortcuts, humans are more likely to 
overestimate the probability of events they remember vividly or where they can recall an 
incidence of occurrence. 115  These signals may stem from misreporting in the press and 
sensation-seeking news stories about incidents and court proceedings in the context of 
volunteering and altruistic activity. The more sensational an item appears to be, the more likely 
it is that it will be reported in the media which, in turn, makes it more likely that the frequency 
of occurrence is overestimated. Research shows that people’s fears are also linked to 
unfavourable media coverage.116 
Although many media outlets truthfully report cases, e.g. Wilkin-Shaw v Fuller117 and 
Cornish Glennroy Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures Ltd, the focus is often on the human tragedy 
                                                 
110 Several heuristics have been identified: representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, simulation heuristic, 
anchoring and adjustment, effect heuristic. In this context the availability heuristic (probability determined by the 
ease with which examples come to mind) is most likely to be relevant. 
111 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 
Science 1124. 
112 Tversky and Kahneman (n 109) 208. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Paul Slovic and others, ‘Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, 
and Rationality’ (2004) 24 Risk Analysis 311, 317. 
115 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Availibility: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability’ in 
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds), Judgement under uncertainty (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1982). 
116 Slovic (n 108) 285. 
117 Wilkin-Shaw v Fuller & Ors (n 85). See, for example, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/9362579/Advice-of-scoutmaster-was-to-blame-for-death-of-teen-on-Ten-Tors-challenge-judge-rules.html 
(accessed 23 February 2017).  
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and who to blame for the accident.118 In a recent article appearing in the BBC News Magazine, 
the statement that 'you are taking a theoretical legal risk if you clear the pavement in front of 
your home' seems to draw particular attention to the potential legal dangers of this ostensible 
act of good citizenship without indicating that the probability of this legal risk materialising is 
very low.119 Moreover, an article that appeared in the Mail online suggested that: 'there is a 
good reason, however, why so few of us bother to clear the pavements outside our homes. 
There remains a deep suspicion that the reward for our efforts might be to end up in a court of 
law being sued by someone who slipped and fell on any snow, slush or ice that we leave 
behind.' 120  The article then proceeds to contradict its hitherto scaremongering tone by 
suggesting categorically that 'no British homeowner can be sued or fined for leaving the 
pavement outside his home knee-deep in snow or coated with naturally-formed ice.' In an 
attempt to balance such reporting, the British government offers advice on snow clearing. It 
states on its official website that it is 'unlikely that you’ll be sued or held responsible if someone 
is injured on a path or pavement if you’ve cleared it carefully.' 121  While we agree that 
information and education are one remedy against sensational reporting, the Government’s 
message is rather cautiously phrased and may not be a strong enough signal to counterbalance 
the perception of liability. The phrase ‘unlikely’ to be sued, for instance, may be insufficient 
to calm the nerves of a risk-averse population.122 This type of language does not pose problems 
for the trained lawyer who knows the rules, but for the untrained amateur the subtleties of 
‘unlikely’ and other rather defensive phrases are less reassuring. What is more, media reporting 
appears to signal that there is a liability risk, even when socially beneficial activities are 
involved.123 
However, it would be too simplistic to state that news reporting alone influences the 
perception of risks and, thus, the perception of negligence liability. Accidents work as signals 
about risks but there is not a straight-forward link between accident reporting and risk 
                                                 
118  Cornish Glennroy Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures Ltd (n 85). See 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/9472311/Teacher-left-paralysed-after-school-trip-loses-
High-Court-claim.html (accessed 23 February 2017). 
119 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8443745.stm (accessed 23 February 2017). 
120  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2098008/Should-fined-dont-clear-snow-path-outside-house.html. 
(accessed 23 February 2017). 
121 https://www.gov.uk/clear-snow-road-path-cycleway (accessed 23 February 2017).  
122 For decision-making and risk, see Tversky and Kahneman (n 115). Individuals tend to be risk averse, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory, An Analysis of Decision under Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 
263. 
123 See, for example, the misleading headline of an article in the Leicester Mercury that is actually very 
informative on snow-clearing: https://www.leicestermercury.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/law-clearing-snow-ice-
footpaths-909444 (accessed 26 March 2018). 
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perception.  High profile accidents can work as (false) signals about risks because they are not 
necessarily related to the number of fatalities. For example, in the Three Mile Island accident, 
where radioactive material was released into the environment in Pennsylvania (USA) in 1979, 
not a single person died as an immediate consequence but it was received as a signal about the 
dangers of nuclear power. It has been shown that the signal potential is related to the 
characteristics of the hazard.124 'Unknown' risks and 'dread risk'125 are likely to increase the 
perception that even a small accident is the 'harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic 
mishaps.'126 Applying these lessons to the perception of negligence liability, there may well be 
a good argument that people fear legal matters.127 Sensationalist news reporting in the context 
of health and safety as well as negligence liability may work as strong signals of a (mere 
theoretical) risk of liability. 
The perception of risk must also be looked at in the context of perceived benefits. This 
is particularly important with regard to altruistic acts. We characterised altruistic acts as actions 
for which the intervener does not receive a direct benefit in exchange. There is likely to be a 
benefit in a sense that people feel better when they give, but this may be a benefit too small to 
outweigh misperceived risks. Furthermore, Alhakami and Slovic demonstrated that there is an 
inverse relationship between perceived risks and perceived benefits. 128  Activities that are 
judged high in risk tend to be judged low in benefit. It was found that people tend to confound 
benefits and risks in their minds, even if it was, for example, a high benefit and high risk 
activity. If people affix a high(er) risk of liability to altruistic acts, this may also diminish their 
sense of benefit that is associated with a particular activity. In other words, the misperception 
of liability risks could potentially lower the perceived benefits and, thus, diminish the 
willingness to help.129 
 
4.3 Is change required? 
 
                                                 
124 Slovic (n 108) at 283. 
125 Unknown risks are risks that are not being observable, new to the people exposed or where there is little 
knowledge about the risk. The dread factor includes criteria such as uncontrollability of risk, possibility of a global 
catastrophe, high risk to future generations, risks not being easily reduced and involuntariness. 
126 Slovic (n 108) 283–284. 
127 It is not clear whether people are afraid of legal entanglement to the extent that it becomes a dread risk.  
128 Ali S Alhakami and Paul Slovic, ‘A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk 
and Perceived Benefit’ [1994] 14 Risk Analysis 1085. 
129 There is some evidence that people are willing to hurt themselves when helping, Christopher Y. Olivola, Eldar 
Shafir, ‘The Martyrdom Effect: When Pain and Effort Increase Prosocial Contributions’ (2013) 26 (1) Behavioral 
Decision Making 91. The decision to incur pain may be context-dependant. 
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There are few reasons to fear that a helper or Good Samaritan will be held liable for negligence 
under English law. In the previous subsection, we have shown that there is evidence that the 
public predictably over- or underestimates risks. This is likely to apply to the risk of negligence 
liability too. As a consequence of overestimating the probability of liability, individuals may 
reduce their efforts to help.130 For lawyers, the intuitive reaction to a legal problem is to call 
for a change. In this instance, rule changes may not have the desired effect because it is the 
perception of the rules that causes the problem. 
The first and rather trivial conclusion is to consider the public’s attitude:131 The general 
public is not aware of negligence rules or able to tell that the law is lenient in cases of altruism. 
This means providing better guidance. That there is guidance available on altruistic acts does 
not mean that it is helpful. If, for example, we look at the area that has determined the title of 
this paper, we find that the Government’s Guidance on snow clearing is lacking.132  The 
government’s webpage is meant to encourage the general public to clear snow. However, it 
addresses the issue of liability first and does so in a negative way. The introductory paragraph 
reads: “You can clear snow and ice from pavements yourself. It’s unlikely that you’ll be sued 
or held responsible if someone is injured on a path or pavement if you’ve cleared it carefully.” 
The phrase ‘unlikely’ is vague and the problem is that people tend to interpret ambiguous 
probabilities corresponding to their existing beliefs.133 Those who heard about liability for 
injuries sustained on cleared footpaths (although we have not been able to identify a case), or 
those of us who are generally risk averse, will overestimate the remaining risk and are likely 
to be discouraged from keeping paths clear from snow. Lord Hodgson referred to this as 
guidance being phrased in negative terms. 134  The lesson for the law is to communicate 
positively or express probabilities more precisely, but this is sometimes a difficult position for 
lawyers to adopt as they are often inclined to formulate advice cautiously.135 
 
                                                 
130 Another potential consequence of misconceived risks is that individuals and organisations are likely to spend 
more on risk assessments and insurance. For the value of risk assessment in recent court proceedings, see Reynolds 
v Strutt & Parker LLP (n 85); Wilkin-Shaw v Fuller & Ors (n 75); Cornish Glennroy Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures 
Ltd (n 75). 
131 In the context of risk perception, see Slovic (n 108) 285. 
132 https://www.gov.uk/clear-snow-road-path-cycleway. 
133 See, for example, Craig R Fox, Amos Tversky, ‘A Belief-Based Account of Decision Under Uncertainty’ 
(1998) 44(7) Management Science 879. 
134 Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (n 3) 4. 
135 A good example of those difficulties is that the authors of this article could not agree on how the Government’s 
advice on snow-clearing could be phrased more positively. 
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Another issue is how to counter sensational reporting that influences perceptions of 
liability. The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (SARAH) was an attempt 
to reassure volunteers that the courts will consider the context of their actions in the event that 
they are sued for negligence or breach of statutory duty.136 In a research paper underpinning 
the SARAH Bill, it was pointed out that the general public fears liability in situations where 
there is no or little risk of negligence liability.137 Thus, one of the aims of SARAH ought to 
have been to redress that fear. However, the message the Act seeks to convey may not have 
reached the correct audience. The Act is certainly well intentioned insofar as it seeks to reduce 
the scope for liability of volunteers, but the difficulty is that the only people who generally read 
statutes are lawyers and judges. Thus, any influence it may have in terms of remedying 
unfounded fears of liability from the public may be severely limited, especially if it is 
unsupported by any sustained public information campaign designed to reach a wider target 
audience. As a standalone intervention, the placating effect of any legislation will be 
meaningless unless the key message of only a remote chance of liability can be simplified and 
conveyed to the general public in an easily decipherable format. This may be easier said than 
done though as SARAH, like many other statutes, uses open language that requires 
interpretation. If the intended purpose was to educate and reassure volunteers, it may not be 
suitable to achieve that objective. The language is neither clear enough to be understood by 
non-lawyers,138 nor is it positively phrased.139 It seems to have created more ‘shades of grey’ 
instead of the desired certainty. 
If the UK Government wishes to send a much stronger message to encourage acts of 
altruism in society, it could consider introducing total immunity from negligence liability for 
Good Samaritans and volunteers, or a higher threshold such as gross negligence or reckless 
disregard. 140  A similar position exists in the USA, where volunteers are protected from 
negligence lawsuits unless they act wilfully or recklessly.141 The legal benefits of volunteer 
                                                 
136 Catherine Fairbairn and John Woodhouse, ‘Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill, Bill No 9 of 2014-
15’ (2014) Research paper; UK Government, ‘Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill, Fact Sheet’ (05 
August 2016) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/318839/sarah-bill-
fact-sheet.pdf (accessed 05 August 2016). 
137 Fairbairn and Woodhouse (n 136). 
138 What does ‘must have regard to’ mean? What is a ‘predominantly responsible approach’? When is someone 
acting for the ‘benefit of society or parts thereof’? 
139 Critics argue that SARAH is also a questionable use of legislative resources. See Lord Pannick HL Deb 04 
November 2013, vol 756, col 1563. 
140 E.g. Section 680 of the German Civil Code limits tort liability of rescuers to intent or gross negligence if 
there was an imminent danger for the life or health of the injured person. 
141 See 42 U.S.C. 14501-05. Immunity does not extend to harm caused by a volunteer operating a motor vehicle.  
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immunity laws are unclear, but, as Horwitz and others have pointed out, immunity laws may 
well be able to increase the perceived safety from legal actions.142 The authors found that the 
law is likely to affect individuals' decisions to volunteer, and that those who live in jurisdictions 
with immunity laws (in the USA) are more likely to volunteer than those who live in non-
immunity States. 143  This perhaps suggests that the general public’s perception changes, 
depending on the messages that are sent. To this end, introducing immunity for voluntary acts, 
coupled with effective communication of that legal position to the public, could cause a greater 
willingness among society to act altruistically144 It is doubtful that there will be immunity 
legislation for volunteers in the UK any time soon. However, as we have identified, the manner 
in which English law has developed means that immunity rules are not, in actual fact, necessary 
to achieve to goal of encouraging people to help. What is needed is a more effective public 
information campaign to set out that there is only a slight risk of liability and, if conducted 
appropriately, this could have the same beneficial effect as guaranteeing immunity. 
The US experience as well as the available evidence demonstrate that for the general 
public the perception of law matters and often exaggerates real threat from liability. Hence, the 
challenge for lawyers and policy makers is to communicate more effectively the actual position 
that the law adopts. The Government’s website on snow clearing is a good starting point, but 
much more has to be done to make volunteers understand that they will not be liable if they 
use common sense and take reasonable care. Lord Young called for more clarity in his report 
on “Common Sense Common Safety”: "Clarify (through legislation if necessary) that people 
will not be held liable for any consequences due to well-intentioned voluntary acts on their 
part."145  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this article we have sought to illustrate that, while a risk of liability does exist in respect of 
volunteers, the chance of that risk ever materialising is remote, and perhaps overestimated. It 
is likely that a helper who accidently causes harm owes a duty of care because she may have 
                                                 
142 Horwitz, Jill R. Mead, Joseph, ‘Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and Tort 
Deterrence’ (2009) 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 585. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid at 627. 
145 Young of Graffham, ‘Common Sense Common Safety’ (2010) 15. 
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either created a new risk or assumed responsibility. However, as we have argued above, the 
courts are unlikely to find a breach of duty due to a more forgiving standard of care applied to 
helpers. The benefit of altruistic actions and the desire to incentives volunteering will normally 
outweigh factors supporting a breach of duty.146 Both the lack of actual cases squarely on point, 
and the way in which judges have approached the assessment of breach, support this 
contention. The threshold for imposing liability has, rightly, been set at a high level and the 
upshot is that, in most cases, it is highly unlikely that anyone who provides help or assistance 
will be liable to pay compensation in negligence where they have caused harm as a result of 
their voluntary actions.    
 The problem is that the sympathetic approach that has been adopted by judges in 
England in respect of volunteers may be largely unrecognised by members of society. The 
majority of people, quite understandably, will have very little awareness of how the substantive 
legal rules operate and the fact that they are weighted heavily towards safeguarding Good 
Samaritan behaviour. It follows that there may still be a problem with misleading perceptions 
of the law and a skewed understanding of how likely it is to be held liable for altruistic acts 
that do not go according to plan.  This, in turn, may be having a negative impact upon people's 
enthusiasm to provide voluntary help to others.   
 People may sometimes fall into the trap of thinking that there is a greater risk of being 
sued than is actually the case. We have suggested that this view can be mitigated against, at 
least to an extent, by effective signalling and communication that more accurately reflects the 
law and informs about realistic probabilities of liability. Both the Compensation Act 2006 and 
SARAH attempt to address how voluntary acts ought to be assessed by judges when 
considering the appropriate standard of care, but whether or not these provisions go far enough 
is subject to debate. Misleading information portrayed by certain sections of the media may be 
a culprit in contributing towards bystander apathy and thus we suggest it is incumbent on the 
government to provide a higher degree of clarity in communication the law. This could be 
achieved by ensuring that there is a greater emphasis placed on education and enhanced 
guidance to inform people more comprehensively about the true nature of the legal position in 
regard to offering assistance, which may be one way of tempering some of the exaggerated 
scenarios that surround the threat of liability. The impact of this may hopefully contribute 
                                                 
146 Our analysis does not deal with issues of causation and remoteness and we have not addressed potential 
questions regarding the defences available against an action in negligence, particularly contributory negligence 
and volenti non fit injuria. 
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towards a greater willingness amongst people in society to offer help to their fellow neighbours 
on a more frequent basis. 
 
